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139 
A SHEEP IN WOLF’S CLOTHING:  
THE MICHIGAN CIVIL RIGHTS INITIATIVE AS 
THE SAVIOR OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
Ryan C. Hess* † 
The University of Michigan has long been a place of important discus-
sions about civil and human rights. On the steps of the Michigan Student 
Union, only a few paces from the Law School, lies an inconspicuous marker 
where then-President John F. Kennedy, Jr. dedicated the United States Peace 
Core. During the Vietnam War, the University played host to significant pro-
tests that changed how we think about war and its consequences. Most 
recently, the University litigated a series of Supreme Court cases that have 
helped define the role of educational institutions in the quest for equality. 
This role promises to continue given the passage of the Michigan Civil 
Rights Initiative (“MCRI”). 
I decided to study law at the University of Michigan partly due to its 
past and continuing presence in civil rights debates, but I must admit that I 
have been disappointed. As I listened to University President Mary Sue 
Coleman’s speech regarding the MCRI’s adoption by Michigan voters, I 
didn’t experience what I had hoped to feel: a religious fervor against injus-
tice, a deep-seeded anger, a belief that what had happened was wrong. Even 
when I hear people talk about “building the new civil rights movement,” I 
am left asking, “What movement?” As I reflect on my responses, I am 
frightened and wonder what has gone so wrong with the conversation about 
diversity, affirmative action, and equality that the concepts seem so less 
meaningful than they once did.  
While I worry about how the MCRI will affect equal access to educa-
tion, the MCRI may create a positive outcome by encouraging us to ask 
important unanswered questions: Are affirmative action and diversity, as 
currently conceived, working well? If not, how might the MCRI revitalize a 
discussion on legal theories that may benefit those structurally excluded 
from societal power and opportunity?  
I. The Diversity Debacle and a Chance to 
Start over after the MCRI 
Diversity may be the most overused and least understood term in the 
current civil rights lexicon: it is ubiquitous and its authority unquestionable. 
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Thomas Benton, the pseudonymed columnist for the Chronicle of Higher 
Education, quips in the December 8, 2006 edition that the mantra of diver-
sity has become so pervasive and unquestioned in its meaning and values 
that it is merely “white noise.” Indeed, in her speech responding to the 
MCRI’s adoption, President Coleman used the word twenty-one times.  
Affirmative action has faltered in recent years, and many of its problems 
stem from how we think about “diversity,” affirmative action’s main object. 
Diversity has assumed two different meanings. First and most significantly 
for individuals, diversity means equal opportunity: as the standard assump-
tion goes, if a student body looks “diverse,” the school must be giving 
people equal opportunity. Second, diversity can mean viewpoint diversity: 
an effective educational system must have people with competing ideas.  
In recent years, the latter definition has overtaken the former, resulting 
in a dilution of the focus on equal opportunity, and Court opinions have di-
rectly contributed to this change. In Grutter v. Bollinger, the Supreme Court 
held that affirmative actions programs are justified in the educational setting 
because they create viewpoint diversity, not because they promote equal 
opportunity. This determination is certainly practical. American courts have 
difficulty recognizing and articulating structural power inequalities and thus 
rarely uphold race- or gender-conscious admission based on these policies. 
Yet this practicality exacts a high price, diverting the focus of affirmative 
action away from equality of opportunity. Indeed, the justification in Grutter 
is patently demeaning to those of us from “diverse” backgrounds. In es-
sence, the Court and litigants say that non-white, non-straight, non-male 
folks are needed to teach the good-old-boys’ club what a lack of structural 
privilege means. In exchange, these diverse candidates are offered admis-
sion to a prestigious school.  
Not only is viewpoint diversity a poor justification for diversity, it leads 
many to characterize almost everyone as diverse, again eroding diversity and 
affirmative action’s focus on equal opportunity. Currently, many organiza-
tions emphasize that diversity can mean any kind of difference: black or 
white, public high school or private boarding school, cat owner or dog lover, 
and the list goes on, edging ever closer to the postmodern abyss and away 
from the pursuit of equal opportunity. Conceiving diversity this way leads to 
perverse results by transforming privilege, like attending a well-funded pub-
lic high school, into diversity.  
To the extent that diversity implements equal opportunity, the term is 
beginning to fail because the connection between a denial of equal opportu-
nity and characteristics such as race, gender, and sexual orientation is 
beginning to come apart, even if only slightly.  
The divergence may be best seen in the white gay world. Consider two 
gay men, one coming of age in the poor, rural South and another in midtown 
Manhattan during the mid-1990s. Most likely, the man growing up in the 
South has overcome significant disadvantage due to his sexual orientation. 
Even surviving to adulthood by avoiding the high rate of gay teen suicide 
and interpersonal violence toward gays may be a significant accomplish-
ment. While the man from midtown also lived in a heterosexually-centered 
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culture, he has probably encountered less homophobia and had to overcome 
fewer struggles. These differences don’t make one person better than the 
other, but they do add meaning and context to each one’s accomplishments. 
Yet under a viewpoint diversity analysis, such as the rationale in Grutter, the 
man from midtown may have more knowledge to share about queer culture 
than the man from the South and thereby be preferred.  
Concern over the causal connection can be seen on both sides of the po-
litical spectrum. Well-intended conservatives are leery about affirmative 
action programs because they believe that not all people with traditionally 
minoritizing characteristics are equally minoritized. Liberals, like former 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, also articulate the same belief. When placed 
in this context, her uncharacteristically off-color remark that affirmative 
action programs will no longer be necessary in twenty-five years makes 
some sense. 
Certainly, this is not to say that the world will be sex- and race-equal 
anytime soon. The complex connections between these concepts and class 
continue to evolve and be understood in new ways. As we come to under-
stand these interactions better, however, we are also called to more 
accurately implement and articulate them.  
For this reason, the MCRI forces us to consider and redevelop what af-
firmative action means, specifically by eliminating consideration of race, 
gender, and other factors. In fact, these were never the considerations behind 
affirmative action. Today, affirmative action and diversity mean what they 
have (or should have) always meant: those who show an incredible ability to 
progress socially despite the odds have a higher chance of being academi-
cally successful. Affirmative action never granted preference based on race, 
gender, or any other criteria; those symbols were used simply as proxies for 
achievement against the odds.  
While the concept can be stated simply, implementation is difficult. A 
recent article in the Chronicle of Higher Education may offer one solution. 
ETS, the company that owns the College Board, developed a formula that 
looks to identify “strivers,” or those who have shown academic potential 
while overcoming adversity. ETS suppressed the research during Grutter so 
that the Court could not look to it as a replacement for race- and gender-
conscious admissions. Nonetheless, initial reports suggest that the research 
is solid and that the formula actually produces equally “diverse” classes 
without considering race, gender, and the other impermissible factors under 
the MCRI.  
Thus, while at first blush the MCRI appears to thwart affirmative action 
efforts, it may force universities to more accurately implement the goal be-
hind affirmative action, equal opportunity. By looking to the full spectrum 
of an applicant’s ability to achieve despite adversity—not simply consider-
ing race, gender, or other criteria as proxies for such achievement—
universities can comply with the law while fulfilling their commitments to 
equal opportunity. 
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II. I Prefer Preference 
The MCRI also holds the potential for positive change because it out-
laws “preference” in addition to “discrimination” based on various 
characteristics. This slight change in language can very beneficial to civil 
rights claims because preference seems to lack the requirement of bad intent 
that discrimination claims require. While the concept of diversity has moved 
toward meaningless babble, discrimination has shown a remarkably tena-
cious inability to depart from anything other than “invidious” or directly 
intentional wrongdoing. As Catherine MacKinnon frequently notes in her 
groundbreaking text Sex Equality, a major barrier to both racial and gender 
equality lies in the Court’s requirement that unconstitutional discrimination 
claimants show a specific bad intent, or invidious discrimination, specifi-
cally linked to either racial or gender characteristics. 
Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic demonstrates the legal impo-
tency of discrimination rhetoric. The case involved a group of abortion 
protestors who obstructed women’s access to abortion clinics. The women 
brought suit under a post-Reconstruction constitutional tort that prohibits 
conspiracies to deprive people of their constitutional rights based on their 
status in a protected group. Clearly, women belong to a protected class and 
the Court had already twice affirmed their constitutional right to abortion. 
Yet, in an opinion only a lawyer could write or understand, Justice Scalia 
wrote that the abortion protestors had not interfered with the women’s 
rights—discriminated against them—because they were women, but merely 
in spite of their being women. Thus, even where the law clearly seemed to 
prohibit discriminatory conduct, the Court failed to increase substantive 
equality by eroding discrimination. 
In today’s educational environment, especially in law schools, one need 
not look hard to find preference, especially in favor of men. This preference 
is reflected in everything from the subtle to the painfully obvious.  
For example, the Law School recently celebrated the success of a faculty 
member’s litigation in Hammon v. Indiana, wherein he argued that the Con-
frontation Clause limits the government’s ability to prosecute domestic 
abusers if the victim doesn’t testify. Arguably, this is the worst case of the 
Supreme Court term for women—people who comprise half the Law 
School’s enrollment. Yet the Law School celebrated the case as a great vic-
tory, apparently ignorant to its substantive impact on women’s lives, health, 
and freedom, as well as the gendered nature of the Confrontation Clause 
itself.  
Most recently, a study of Harvard Law School’s “gunners,” law students 
who feel especially empowered in the Socratic environment, revealed that 
almost all of them are men, and anecdotal evidence suggests this is a wide-
spread phenomenon. From this perspective, law schools design much of 
what people experience to benefit men and to force women to conform to 
men’s standards. This critique has been expansively explored by 
MacKinnon, who is one of the few professors to realize the preferential na-
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ture of the Socratic method and attempt to find alternatives that more 
equally distribute power and preference in the law school classroom.  
These examples do not imply that those who run top law schools despise 
women; most are probably very progressive. I also don’t mean to suggest 
these events only occur at top law schools or only affect women. As an intel-
lectual community, we are just beginning to understand how various 
practices grant and deny preference.  
Given that these understandings are just emerging, litigation based on 
preference may provide a powerful tool for reaching substantive equality by 
significantly restructuring how we learn and teach. Further, because prefer-
ence can be read not to require specific animus, many of these claims may 
succeed where traditional discrimination claims have failed.   
Fresh starts are rare in the legal world. The MRCI offering one such op-
portunity, and those of us committed to equal opportunity must seize the 
chance to rethink our prior approaches, advance increasingly progressive 
legal theories, and ultimately reignite old passions. In our future endeavors, 
especially in the wake of the MCRI, we can only hope that these efforts will 
lead us to what Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. termed “the beloved commu-
nity.”  
